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Civil litigation is expensive, both for the party bringing suit and the party that must defend against such
claims. For a variety of reasons, not the least of which are the usual requests for preliminary relief and
protective orders, trade secret litigation is particularly expensive. These costs can have a crippling effect on
small businesses and start-up companies that are accused of trade secret misappropriation, often resulting in
litigation expenses that exceed the alleged harm to the plaintiff. Such litigation is particularly costly and unjust
in cases where the plaintiff asserts rights that, due to common misunderstandings about the limited scope of
trade secret rights, they do not have.
While no body of law can perfectly distinguish right from wrong, and, thus, there are bound to be civil
judgments that are both under- and over-inclusive, due to the possible anticompetitive effects of trade secret
claims, the predominate law that currently governs trade secret law in the United States, the Uniform Trade
Secret Act, includes numerous provisions that are designed to strike a balance between the putative trade
secret owner and the alleged misappropriator, frequently erring on the side of competition, information
diffusion, and employee mobility. Unfortunately, the proposed legislation to create a civil cause of action for
trade secret misappropriation, the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), threatens to upset this balance by,
among other things, significantly increasing the costs of trade secret litigation.
This Essay details how various provisions of the DTSA are bound to be highly litigated and, as a result, will
greatly increase costs for litigants and the federal judiciary, making the DTSA not worth its costs.
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The DTSA: The Litigator’s Full-
Employment Act 
Sharon K. Sandeen* 
Abstract 
Civil litigation is expensive, both for the party bringing suit 
and the party that must defend against such claims. For a variety 
of reasons, not the least of which are the usual requests for 
preliminary relief and protective orders, trade secret litigation is 
particularly expensive. These costs can have a crippling effect on 
small businesses and start-up companies that are accused of trade 
secret misappropriation, often resulting in litigation expenses that 
exceed the alleged harm to the plaintiff. Such litigation is 
particularly costly and unjust in cases where the plaintiff asserts 
rights that, due to common misunderstandings about the limited 
scope of trade secret rights, they do not have. 
 While no body of law can perfectly distinguish right from 
wrong, and, thus, there are bound to be civil judgments that are 
both under- and over-inclusive, due to the possible anticompetitive 
effects of trade secret claims, the predominate law that currently 
governs trade secret law in the United States, the Uniform Trade 
Secret Act, includes numerous provisions that are designed to 
strike a balance between the putative trade secret owner and the 
alleged misappropriator, frequently erring on the side of 
competition, information diffusion, and employee mobility. 
Unfortunately, the proposed legislation to create a civil cause of 
action for trade secret misappropriation, the Defend Trade Secrets 
                                                                                                     
 * Sharon K. Sandeen is a professor of law at Hamline University School 
of Law and the author (with E. Rowe) of three books on the subject of trade 
secret law: Cases and Materials on Trade Secret Law (West 2012); Trade Secret 
Law in a Nutshell (West 2013); and Trade Secrecy and International 
Transactions (Edward Elgar 2015). Prior to becoming a law professor, Professor 
Sandeen practiced civil litigation for over fifteen years, handling numerous 
cases in both state and federal courts. 
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Act (DTSA), threatens to upset this balance by, among other 
things, significantly increasing the costs of trade secret litigation. 
This Essay details how various provisions of the DTSA are 
bound to be highly litigated and, as a result, will greatly increase 
costs for litigants and the federal judiciary, making the DTSA not 
worth its costs. 
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I. Introduction 
When individual citizens sue U.S. businesses, policymakers 
often lament the litigious nature of U.S. society and call for tort 
reform as a means to limit lawsuits and reduce litigation costs. 
Thus, it is surprising that U.S. lawmakers have recently proposed 
the adoption of a new federal tort that will enable more federal 
lawsuits to be brought against U.S. businesses, particularly small 
businesses and start-up companies. Titled the “Defend Trade 
Secrets Act” (DTSA),1 the proposed new law would amend the 
federal Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA)2 to create a 
                                                                                                     
 1. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015, H.R. 3326, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2012). 
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private federal right of action for trade secret misappropriation 
when similar state causes of action already exist to protect U.S. 
trade secrets. 
For nearly two hundred years, the body of state law that 
currently enables trade secret owners to enforce their rights, in 
either state or federal court (the latter based upon diversity 
jurisdiction), has served trade secret owners in the U.S. well, 
particularly as it evolved and was later codified in the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) to include clearer definitions and 
broader remedies.3 Many trade secret cases are unsuccessful, 
however, not because of deficiencies in existing state laws, but 
because of the non-existence of legitimate trade secrets or the 
absence of evidence of misappropriation. Even worse, weak or 
non-existent trade secret rights are often asserted against start-
up companies that, in “the American Way,” simply want a chance 
to start a business that they believe will provide benefits to 
consumers. 
Although touted as essential legislation for the protection of 
U.S. trade secrets, no evidence has been presented to 
demonstrate that the existing system of uniform state laws—
particularly when coupled with existing federal laws—is 
insufficient to protect the interests of legitimate trade secret 
owners.4 In fact, the current system was recently ranked the best 
                                                                                                     
 3. See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why 
Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 501 (2010) 
By the time of the adoption of the UTSA in 1979, forty years had 
passed since the publication of the Restatement First [of Torts] and 
the drafters of the UTSA had the benefit of the further common law 
development of trade secret law. Also by then, the courts of law and 
equity in the United States had merged and there was a much 
greater reliance on and reception of statutory law. . . . [B]ecause the 
UTSA is a code rather than a restatement of existing law, it was used 
to fill gaps in the law that had not been filled by common law courts 
and to refine or change common law principles that were considered 
ill-advised. 
 4. To date, forty-seven of the fifty states, plus Puerto Rico and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, making it one of 
the most widely adopted uniform laws in the United States. Legislative Facts 
Sheet—Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets
%20Act (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
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system for the protection of trade secrets in the world.5 Rather, 
the principal arguments in favor of the legislation are the 
preference of many large companies to litigate in federal courts 
and unsubstantiated claims that cyber-espionage cannot be 
stopped without an additional federal law. Against these asserted 
benefits, little attempt has been made to weigh the costs of the 
DTSA, both in terms of the burdens that it will place on U.S. 
businesses—who will be the targets of federal lawsuits—and the 
federal judiciary.  
This Essay aims to rectify this deficiency by considering 
what, if anything, the DTSA will add to trade secret enforcement 
that state laws do not already provide and at what costs. After 
considering these questions, this Essay concludes that the 
marginal benefits of the DTSA do not outweigh its costs, 
principally because the creation of a new federal civil cause of 
action will significantly increase the incidence and magnitude of 
federal trade secret litigation, at both the district court and 
appellate court levels, thereby making the DTSA the “Litigator’s 
Full-Employment Act.” 
II. The Asserted Benefits of the DTSA 
A number of arguments have been made to support the 
passage of the DTSA, but the fundamental question is: Will the 
DTSA be an improvement over the existing system of state laws 
and, if so, at what costs? Simply arguing that “more is better,” or 
that federal law somehow has more deterrent effects than state 
law, is not a compelling basis for new federal legislation, 
especially when a well-developed body of state law already exists. 
While a more convincing policy argument in favor of the DTSA is 
that trade secret misappropriation is “wrong” and that U.S. 
businesses are “harmed” when their trade secrets are taken, 
                                                                                                     
Review). 
 5. See Mark F. Schultz & Douglas C. Lippoldt, Approaches to Protection of 
Undisclosed Information (Trade Secrets): Background Paper 30–32 (OECD 
Trade Policy Papers, Working Paper No. 162, 2014) (providing a trade secrets 
protection index and component scores by country), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz9z43w0jnw-en. 
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those arguments are already addressed by the existing body of 
state and federal laws that provide civil remedies and criminal 
penalties for trade secret misappropriation. 
The rhetoric surrounding the proposed legislation speaks to 
threats of cyber-espionage and the problem of foreign spies, but 
the DTSA does not directly address those concerns by defining 
new or different wrongs. Rather, it merely adopts the UTSA 
definition of wrongful acquisition of trade secrets through 
“improper means,” which has long been defined to include 
“espionage through electronic or other means.”6 Such behavior is 
not only already prohibited by the UTSA7 but is also a federal 
crime according to the existing language of the EEA,8 and the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) already exists to directly 
address the problem of computer hacking.9  
Some argue that a federal law that amends the EEA is 
needed to take advantage of its extra-territorial provision so that 
U.S. companies might be more successful in pursuing actions 
against individuals who are located in, or move to, foreign 
countries.10 The extra-territorial provision of the EEA is weak, 
however, particularly with respect to individuals who reside in 
foreign countries. Significantly, § 1837 of the EEA does not apply 
to non-U.S. citizens and non-permanent resident aliens of the 
U.S. who are alleged to have misappropriated trade secrets 
located outside the United States. Although the extra-territorial 
provision of the EEA might apply to foreigners who commit an 
act within the U.S. “in furtherance of the offense,” it does not 
solve the related issues of whether U.S. courts can obtain 
personal jurisdiction over such individuals and whether any 
resulting judgment can be enforced.  
                                                                                                     
 6. H.R. 3326 § 2(b). 
 7. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
 8. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2012). 
 9. Id. § 1030. 
 10. See R. Mark Halligan, Protection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets: Critical 
Amendments to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 656, 669 (2008) (“The proposed amendments to the EEA would extend 
the benefits of extraterritorial jurisdiction to EEA civil actions which, in turn, 
will provide significant new protection against the rampant economic espionage 
attacks directed toward U.S. companies.”). 
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Whittling away the substantive arguments in favor of the 
DTSA, one is left with the impression that the principal reason 
behind the proposed legislation is the preference of large U.S. 
companies to pursue litigation in federal, instead of state, courts. 
One reason for this preference is undoubtedly the fear that the 
proverbial “federal case” instills in some litigants and their 
lawyers (thereby often leading to quick capitulation of even weak 
cases), but there is also the perception that federal court 
procedures and federal judges are simply better at handling 
business litigation. 
III. The Costs of the DTSA 
Against the asserted benefits of the DTSA, Congress should 
consider its costs. As further explained below, these costs include 
the anticipated increase in the number of trade secret cases that 
will be filed in federal court, plus the increased complexity of 
federal litigation, particularly in the early stages of trade secret 
litigation. 
 
A. More Trade Secret Cases Will Be Filed in Federal Court 
 
Currently, a significant number of trade secret cases are filed 
in federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction. With the 
passage of the DTSA, this number will increase to include cases 
where the factual predicates for federal subject matter under the 
DTSA (discussed below) can be shown. While this number is 
unlikely to be 100% of all trade secret cases filed in the U.S., it 
can be anticipated that a large percentage of all cases currently 
filed in state courts will, in the future, be filed in federal courts. 
This will increase the case load of the federal judiciary.  
As noted previously, one of the asserted justifications for the 
DTSA is that federal courts are better at handling complex 
business litigation, but then why not transfer other state court 
business cases to federal court? For instance, why not grant 
federal subject matter jurisdiction to breach of contract claims 
that, to use the jurisdictional language of the DTSA, “relate to a 
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product or service used in or intended for use in, interstate 
commerce”?11 More importantly, does such an argument justify 
the adoption of a federal law that essentially mirrors state law? 
One reason we have state courts and state litigation, 
including for complex business litigation, is because federal court 
jurisdiction is limited by the U.S. Constitution and because we 
have historically had faith in the ability of state court judges to 
handle such matters. Another reason is that there are significant 
costs associated with the creation of new federal causes of action. 
These reasons alone counsel against adoption of the DTSA.  
B. The Constitutional Basis for the DTSA Will Be Challenged 
Frequently 
Because the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited by the 
U.S. Constitution,12 a federal court is precluded from making a 
decision on the merits of a case unless it is first determined that 
the court has proper jurisdiction.13 In the case of alleged subject 
matter jurisdiction, this means that it must first be shown that 
the lawsuit “arises under the laws of the United States.” While 
the DTSA will be the law that provides subject matter 
jurisdiction for federal courts to hear trade secret 
misappropriation claims, whether the factual predicates for such 
jurisdiction can be met is a different—and sure to be highly 
litigated—question. 
As a law based upon Congress’s powers under the Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution,14 it is necessary for the DTSA to 
                                                                                                     
 11. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015, H.R. 3326, 114th Cong. § 2(a) (2015). 
 12. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (delineating federal judicial power). 
 13. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999) (noting 
that personal jurisdiction is an essential element of a district court’s 
jurisdiction, without which the court is powerless to proceed adjudication). 
 14. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2012) (“Whoever, with intent to convert a trade 
secret, that is related to a product or service used in or intended for use in 
interstate or foreign commerce . . . .”); Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015, H.R. 
3326, 114th Cong. § 2(a) (2015) (“An owner of a trade secret may bring a civil 
action under this subsection if the person is aggrieved by a misappropriation of 
a trade secret that is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use 
in, interstate or foreign commerce.”) . 
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include a provision that establishes a sufficient and plausible 
connection between the alleged wrongdoing (trade secret 
misappropriation) and interstate commerce. In an attempt to 
make this connection, the DTSA includes language which reads: 
An owner of a trade secret may bring a civil action under this 
subsection if the person is aggrieved by a misappropriation of 
a trade secret that is related to a product or service used in, or 
intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.15 
While the intent of this language is clearly to satisfy the 
interstate commerce (and therefore, Constitutional) requirement, 
its practical implications—particularly in cases where 
preliminary relief is sought—have not been thought through and 
are bound to lead to various procedural motions concerning the 
Constitutional adequacy of both the language of the DTSA and 
the facts of cases brought under it. This is because proof of a 
connection with interstate commerce is not only an element of the 
cause of action that must be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff, 
but it is an essential factual and Constitutional predicate for 
federal court jurisdiction. 
The essential problem with the DTSA’s jurisdictional clause 
is that trade secrets, unlike trademarks, are—by definition—not 
visible to the world in a way that their connection to interstate 
commerce can easily be understood and tested by the courts. 
Furthermore, even when applying the broad definition of “in 
commerce” that is a feature of trademark jurisprudence,16 
because the breadth and nature of trade secrets is different from 
trademarks, it is likely that a significant number of trade secrets 
exist in the United States that are not “related to a product or 
service that is used or intended for use in interstate commerce.” 
As a consequence of these two facts, it is also likely that trade 
secret litigation brought under the DTSA will involve frequent 
challenges to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, at great costs 
to the litigants and the federal judiciary. 
                                                                                                     
 15. H.R. 3326 § 2(a). 
 16. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2009) 
([C]omplaint fails to state a claim under the Lanham Act unless it alleges that 
the defendant has made “use in commerce” of the plaintiff's trademark as the 
term “use in commerce” is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127.”).  
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But it is not just the litigation costs that should be of 
concern. Of even greater concern, particularly to trade secret 
owners, is how the jurisdictional clause of the DTSA threatens 
the secrecy of the alleged trade secrets and is likely to slow down 
trade secret litigation—particularly at the preliminary relief 
stage. By specifying a use requirement, plaintiffs in federal trade 
secret cases will be required to plead (in accordance with well-
pleaded complaint jurisprudence)17 significant facts about their 
trade secrets that they ordinarily do not like to disclose early in a 
case. Specifically, they will not only have to allege the existence of 
viable and subsisting trade secrets, but also must disclose which 
products or services sold in interstate commerce are “related to” 
those secrets.   
Because all trade secret owners like to delay the disclosure of 
specifics about their trade secrets until after the pleading stage of 
a case, due to the risk of inadvertent disclosure, the need to 
provide more specifics during the pleading stage will put such 
trade secrets at greater risk. Additionally, this pleading 
requirement will allow defendants to inquire deeper into 
plaintiffs’ business operations in order to determine whether and 
how the alleged trade secrets are “related to” interstate 
commerce.   
As the key factual predicate for federal court jurisdiction, it 
is predictable that defendants in trade secret cases will challenge 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts by arguing that there are no 
alleged trade secrets and, even if there are, that such trade 
secrets are not related to a product or service that is used, or 
intended for use, in interstate commerce. In many types of cases, 
including criminal prosecutions under the EEA, a decision with 
respect to this issue might wait until after the discovery phase of 
a case, but civil trade secret cases are unlike most civil cases. 
                                                                                                     
 17. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.  
(citation omitted). 
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Usually they involve requests for prompt preliminary relief 
(including the DTSA’s proposed civil seizure remedy, discussed 
below), which federal courts have no power to grant without 
proper jurisdiction. Thus, cases brought under the DTSA are 
likely to require early discovery and pleadings concerning the 
factual basis for federal court jurisdiction, which is likely to both 
delay the grant of preliminary relief and complicate the normal 
processes of the federal courts.  
Further complicating matters, if the existence of trade 
secrets is the necessary factual predicate for federal subject 
matter jurisdiction, what happens when—as happens in many 
trade secret cases—the alleged trade secrets cease to be trade 
secrets during the pendency of federal court litigation? If the 
existence of a trade secret related to a product or service in 
interstate commerce is the linchpin for federal subject matter 
jurisdiction, then arguably, the federal courts will lose their 
jurisdiction once the subject trade secrets cease to exist.    
Another problem with the jurisdictional language of the 
DTSA is that it is necessarily limited and, thus, favors some 
types of trade secrets over others. For instance, it does not apply 
to trade secrets that are not in use or intended for future use, 
such as the so-called “negative information” that is protected 
under the UTSA.18 It also does not protect information concerning 
a company’s research and development efforts that have not 
reached a point where a real (as opposed to a hypothetical) use 
has been determined. Perhaps most significantly, it would not 
apply to business information such as marketing plans and 
financial information concerning a business’s overall operations 
unless, in some highly attenuated way, the language “related to” 
is construed to mean any information that somehow touches “a 
product or service used in interstate commerce.” In any case, 
what “related to interstate commerce means” will be a highly 
litigated issue.      
C. The Proposed Seizure Remedy Is New and Untested and Is 
Likely To Be Highly Contested 
                                                                                                     
 18. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1979). 
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One type of preliminary relief that a plaintiff is likely to seek 
in a case brought under the DTSA is the new and untested civil 
seizure order that is the central feature of the DTSA. In pertinent 
part, it provides that a plaintiff in a trade secret case may seek 
an ex parte order “providing for the seizure of property necessary 
to prevent the propagation or dissemination of the trade secret 
that is the subject of the action.”19  
Modeled after similar remedies that are available under 
federal law for the seizure of products that bear counterfeit 
trademarks,20 the proposed new trade secret remedy suffers from 
the same fundamental problem that the jurisdictional clause 
does; namely, trade secrets are not the same as counterfeit 
products. Counterfeit products are tangible and can be seen, 
handled, and physically seized. Trade secrets, on the other hand, 
need not exist in tangible form and are not readily visible. So 
what exactly is “the property” that will be seized under the civil 
seizure provisions of the proposed law? This is likely to be a 
highly litigated issue, particularly if the subject property is not 
the tangible manifestation of the trade secrets themselves, but 
something else—for instance, the computer system of an ongoing 
business.21 
Although trade secret owners undoubtedly view this new 
remedy as a great addition to trade secret law, given the 
jurisdictional problems discussed above and the detailed 
requirements of the proposed remedy, a civil seizure order is 
bound to be met by fierce opposition and emergency motions for 
reconsideration that question the subject matter jurisdiction of 
the federal courts and the merits and scope of the proposed order. 
Further complicating this new remedy, and taking additional 
time and energy of the litigants and the federal courts, are the 
provisions of the proposed law that require: (1) that law 
                                                                                                     
 19. H.R. 3326 § 2(a). 
 20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2012) (“The several courts vested with 
jurisdiction of civil actions arising under this chapter shall have power to grant 
injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the 
court may deem reasonable . . . .”). 
 21. For a more in-depth critique on this provision of the DTSA, see Eric 
Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 72 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. ONLINE 284 (2015). 
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enforcement personnel be involved in the execution of civil 
seizure orders; (2) that federal courts take possession of the 
seized property; and (3) that defendants be allowed to obtain 
specified remedies when such orders are improperly granted.22   
The foregoing requirements add up to tremendous litigation 
costs that many targets of trade secret litigation—often, small 
businesses and start-up companies—are either unlikely to be able 
to afford or that will divert their attention and resources from 
their businesses. If the history of trade secret litigation in the 
United States revealed that the vast majority of plaintiffs won 
their cases, perhaps such costs would be justified as a means to 
protect legitimate trade secrets. But the reality is that such 
claims are often brought when no protectable trade secrets exist, 
often because the plaintiff is upset that a former employee left its 
employ to start a competitive business. Skewing the balance of 
trade secret litigation in favor of large companies that can afford 
the added litigation costs may provide some better and more 
efficient outcomes for those companies, but at the cost of making 
it more difficult for former employees of companies who have a 
good idea and the entrepreneurial bug to start a new business. 
Thus, Congress should think carefully about whether the 
dampening of the entrepreneurial spirit is a cost that it is willing 
to pay for a law that is largely duplicative of state law.      
D. There Is No Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law to Fill 
the Gaps of the DTSA 
Adding further to the costs of the DTSA is the fact that trade 
secret litigants and the federal judiciary will be required to spend 
a lot of time and energy figuring out how to apply the new federal 
law, including determining when and where it is appropriate to 
either borrow from state trade secret principles to fill gaps or 
create “new” federal trade secret jurisprudence. One can predict 
that, given the new playing field created by the DTSA, attorneys 
for both plaintiffs and defendants will argue for the creation of 
federal trade secret principles over established state law 
                                                                                                     
 22. H.R. 3326 §§ 2(a)(2)(E), 2(a)(2)(D), 2(a)(2)(G). 
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principles when it suits their client’s interests and that numerous 
appeals will result.23 
Because trade secret law developed in the United States 
through the common law process, there is currently no federal 
trade secret jurisprudence, except the little that has developed 
under the EEA’s criminal provisions. While this may seem like an 
insignificant fact, it is certain that the federal courts will be 
called upon to determine numerous issues that are not spelled 
out in the DTSA, but which have largely been resolved under 
each state’s case decisions. Thus, far from improving the 
uniformity of trade secret law, the DTSA will create uncertainty 
for decades until a body of federal trade secret jurisprudence is 
developed. Even then, there will be two bodies of trade secret law 
in the U.S., likely leading to confusion and forum shopping. 
One issue in particular that is sure to be highly contested 
concerns the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, which has been 
rejected by some state courts as an improper implied non-compete 
agreement, while embraced by others.24 The remedies provision of 
the DTSA contains language that, at once, might be interrupted 
to both endorse and reject the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, 
thereby adding to the confusion that is sure to follow enactment 
of the DTSA. It states that injunctions can be ordered to prevent: 
[A]ny actual threatened misappropriation described in 
paragraph (1) on such terms as the court deems reasonable, 
provided the order does not prevent a person from accepting as 
                                                                                                     
 23. There are examples of this debate in other areas of federal law. For 
instance, see the copyright case of CCNV v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), where the 
parties and amici fiercely debated whether state law principles of agency should 
apply or a new definition of employment should be recognized. 
 24. Compare Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1447 
(2002) (“In this opinion, we reject the inevitable disclosure doctrine. We hold 
this doctrine is contrary to California law and policy because it creates an after-
the-fact covenant not to compete restricting employee mobility.”), with Cardinal 
Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., 336 Ark. 143, 152–55 
(1999) (noting that there was sufficient evidence to show threatened or 
inevitable misappropriation of former employer's trade secrets by former 
employees who had taken jobs with competitor to justify issuance of injunction 
to prevent new employer from conducting new business with four of former 
employer's customers for one year). 
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offer of employment under conditions that avoid actual or 
threatened misappropriation described in paragraph (1).25 
By stating a proviso to the grant of an injunction against an 
employee, this language could be read to endorse the free trade, 
free competition, and employee mobility sensibilities of states like 
California that severely restrict the enforceability of non-compete 
agreements. But it can also be read to endorse the inevitable 
disclosure inquiry that California and other states reject. Either 
way, given the stakes surrounding this issue, the federal courts 
will be called upon frequently to settle an issue that is fairly well 
settled in all of the fifty states, albeit not in a uniform way due to 
the different values that each state brings to the issue. 
IV. Conclusion 
The debate concerning the DTSA is not a debate about a new 
law (like the CFAA) that is needed to address an entirely new 
problem affecting interstate commerce. Rather, putting rhetoric 
aside, it is a debate about whether some of the trade secret cases 
that are currently handled and enforced in state courts would be 
handled better and more efficiently in federal courts and the  Despite the rhetoric of “theft” and “spying” that surrounds DTSA, there has been no showing that the current system is not working, other than anecdotal stories about the 
difficulties that some trade secret owners have had in enforcing 
their putative rights in some cases. But trade secret litigation, 
like all commercial litigation, is often difficult and costly and, for 
the reasons set forth above, adoption of the DTSA is actually 
likely to increase such costs. More importantly, while the DTSA 
may be a boon for large corporations who prefer to litigate in 
federal courts, it will not be a boon for other businesses—often 
small businesses and start-up companies—who must engage in 
the defense-side of such litigation. It will also not be a boon for 
the federal judiciary that must incur the costs of increased 
caseloads at both the trial and appellate levels. A better, and less 
costly, approach is for Congress to address concerns about cyber-
espionage and foreign spies directly, leaving the more common 
trade secret cases involving allegations against former employees 
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to be resolved by state courts where they have been effectively 
resolved for nearly 200 hundred years.  
